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I.

INTRODUCTION

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' the
Supreme Court held that the common-law "general acceptance"
test for admitting scientific opinion evidence2 did not survive the
codification of federal evidentiary law in the Federal Rules of Evidence.3 The Court concluded that, under Federal Rule of Evidence
702, judges may admit expert testimony which is not yet generally
accepted if it is reliable and relevant.4 Those commentators who
see Daubert as inviting a vast expansion of opinion testimony in
* Assistant Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. B.S., University of
Delaware, 1986; J.D., Boston College, 1989.
** United States District Judge, District of Massachusetts. A.B., Harvard University,
1962; L.L.B., Harvard University, 1967. The authors would like to thank Kathryn Crockett
Lyon for her valuable research assistance.
1. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).

2. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). To be admitted in evidence,
the Frye test required expert testimony to be grounded in theories generally accepted by
experts in the field. See id. at 1014.
3. Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2794.
4. Id. at 2794-95.
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federal trials, however, are likely to be disappointed.5 The
Daubert Court firmly established district court judges as "gatekeepers" of expert opinion testimony-charging them with the
duty to determine whether such testimony is reliable enough to be
admitted for the jury's consideration. A majority of the Supreme
Court in Daubert then delineated criteria for determining the reliability of scientific testimony.7 However, the Court provided no
guidance for determining the reliability of other types of expert
testimony allowed by Rule 702.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is not self-explanatory, and any
approach that depends on the district court judges acting as gatekeepers necessarily runs the risk of idiosyncratic approaches to
admissibility. This risk is magnified by the complexity of the
hypotheses on which a large portion of expert testimony rests.
Thus, the future success of Rule 702 as an intelligible, evenly
applied evidentiary standard depends on the cultivation of a common judicial understanding of its mandate and the development of
a uniform methodology for analysis.
This Article embarks on that effort. Part II analyzes the special challenge faced by the trial judge in considering the admissibility of expert testimony. Part III discusses the impact of Daubert
on the role of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (Rule 702 or the Rule)
in federal trials. Part IV considers the different types of knowledge
embodied in the Rule and dissects the process of common-law codification to present a unified interpretation of the Rule that is sensitive to the specific nature of the underlying data. Part V suggests a
theoretical approach to the crucial determination of reliability in
instances in which the hypotheses offered may not be generally
accepted. Uniform application of this approach to admissibility
will have the beneficial effect of reducing disparity in evidentiary
rulings and promoting predictability in the law, while accommodating new ideas and technologies that may assist a jury in the
factfinding process.

5. For a collection of commentaries on the future implications of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Daubert,see generally Special Report-Daubert. What's Next?, 21 Prod. Safety &

Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, pt. 2 (Summer-Fall 1993).
6. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
7. See id. at 2796-98. The dissenting Justices saw no need to identify the criteria for
admissibility of such testimony. See id. at 2799-2800 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

1994]

DAUBERT'S GATEKEEPER

1459

II. THE DIFFIcuLTY IN EVALUATING EXPERT TEsTIMoNY:
SEPARATING THE WHEAT FROM THE CHAFF

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a lay witness may testify only with respect to matters within her personal knowledgetypically, events perceived by the witness through the exercise of
the five senses.8 At the close of a trial, the jury, not the witness,
must present its opinion of the truth of the matter being tried.9
Thus, it is not surprising that, under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
opinion testimony of lay witnesses generally is excluded from the
evidence at trial, because it is considered unnecessary, irrelevant,
and likely to prejudice the jury's opinion.10
Expert testimony, on the other hand, is admissible in the form
of an opinion.1 Under Rule 702, "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge" in the form of an opinion is admissible if
the court determines that it will "assist" the jury in deciding the
issues of the case. 12 An expert is allowed to present an opinion of
the evidence because the expert is " 'possessed of special or peculiar training, experience, or observation in respect of the subject
under investigation.' ",13
For a number of reasons, experts have an extraordinary opportunity to influence the jury. 4 First, the expert's appearance of
8. See FED.R. EvD. 602 & advisory committee's note; see also Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARv. L. REV. 40, 45
(1901) (stating that a lay witness "swears but to what he hath heard or seen, generally or more
largely, to what hath fallen under his senses").
9. See Hand, supra note 8,at 44 ("It is the jury that should form the opinion, make the
conclusion and say ...

the fact, not the witness.").

10. See FED. R. EVID. 701 (providing that a lay witness's testimony in the "form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based
on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue"). Id.
11. Id. 702.
12. Id.; cf. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962) (reasoning that
expert testimony will not assist the jury when " 'all the primary facts can be accurately and
intelligibly described to the jury, and if they, as men of common understanding, are...
capable of comprehending the primary facts and of drawing correct conclusions from them'"
(quoting United States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 166 F. 407, 415 (8th Cir. 1909))); United States
v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1973) (explaining that expert testimony " 'serves
to inform the court [and jury] about affairs not within the full understanding of the average
man'" (quoting Farris v. Interstate Circuit, 116 F.2d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 1941))).
13. Salem, 370 U.S. at 35 (quoting United States Smelting Co., 166 F. at 415).
14. See, e.g., Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that polygraph experts potentially prejudice jury); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th
Cir. 1975) (reasoning that the jury may incorrectly view polygraph testimony as unimpeachable); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating that scientific proof
may seem infallible in jury's eyes); Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1152 (reasoning that scientific and
expert testimony are likely to create an "aura of special reliability and trustworthiness" to the
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"apparent objectivity" carries "undue weight" in the eyes of the
jury. 15 Additionally, because the basis of an expert's opinion is
beyond the common knowledge of the jury, the jury is less
equipped to evaluate the merit of the expert's opinion. Thus,
despite their renown ability for discerning credibility, jurors do
not, by definition, have the substantive skills to separate the wheat
from the chaff in trying to evaluate the reliability of expert testimony.16 As such, "trial courts must be wary lest the expert become
17
nothing more than an advocate of policy before the jury."'
A.

Determining the Reliability of Lay Testimony

Faced with the duty of determining the reliability of lay testimony, the jury must consider (1) the reliability of the source of the
witness's knowledge, and (2) the witness's credibility.' 8 The first
consideration-the source of the lay witness's knowledge-is uniformly delimited by the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Federal
Rules attempt to ensure that the source of a lay witness's knowledge is reliable, or at least subject to rational evaluation by the
jury, by requiring witnesses to have personal knowledge of the
event about which they will testify.' 9 Litigants must present foundation evidence during trial to show that the witnesses had an
"opportunity to observe" and did "actually observe" the event with
their own senses. 20 A lay witness, therefore, must acquire knowledge of the event through percipient observation. 2 1 As jurors can
readily understand and evaluate the sources of information derived
through the five senses, they need not involve themselves in the
epistemology of the witness's knowledge.
Instead, the primary focus of the jury's factfinding function
with regard to lay testimony is frequently the witness's credibility. 22 In assessing credibility, members of the jury will draw on
their own common sense, judgment, and experience.23 Members
jury); see also Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.

United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. Rav. 1197, 1237 (1980) (stating that the
jury might accept expert testimony without critical scrutiny).
15. United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977).
16. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
17. Eymard v. Pan Am. World Airways (In re Air Crash Disaster), 795 F.2d 1230, 1233

(5th Cir. 1986).
18. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.

19. See FED. R. EvD. 602.
20. Id. 602 advisory committee's note.
21. la.
22. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
23. See Hand, supra note 8, at 52 n.1.
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of the jury are equipped to judge issues of credibility because they
regularly perform such judgments in their daily lives.24
B.

Determining the Reliability of Expert Testimony

Theoretically, determining the reliability of expert opinion
testimony is no different from determining the reliability of lay
testimony. The jury still must evaluate (1) the reliability of the5
source of the expert's knowledge, and (2) the expert's credibility.2
In analyzing the expert's credibility, the members of the jury will
draw on common sense, judgment, and experience in the same
manner they do with lay testimony. In other words, even if an
expert's qualifications are impeccable and the expert's theory is
reliably grounded in what passes for scientific "truth," a jury may
choose to disregard the expert's testimony if its members believe
the expert is biased or otherwise not credible.26
In addition to assessing the expert's credibility, the jury must
necessarily consider, either implicitly or explicitly, the reliability
of the expert's theory.2 7 The problem presented by expert testiIt can hardly be necessary to say that as to the credibility of any witness there always
must remain a question for the jury alone. They have to determine in each case the
fractional coefficient to verity, to borrow from mechanics, and multiply the statements made before them by that fraction, before they can judge. Moreover in getting
the personal equation of each witness, they shall use common sense or the general
inferences of men under [similar] circumstances.
Id.
24. See, e.g., Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Our adversary
system is built on the premise that the jury reviews testimony and determines which version of
events it believes."); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975) (" 'The
most important function served by a jury is in bringing its accumulated experience to bear
upon witnesses testifying before it, in order to distinguish truth from falsity.' "(quoting United
States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 278, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1959))).
25. See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
26. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
27. See Giannelli, supra note 14, at 1200-04 (analyzing the components of reliability).
An evaluation of reliability includes an examination of (1) the validity of the underlying principle, (2) the validity of the technique used to apply the principle, and (3) the accurate application of the technique on the particular occasion. Id. Once the jury gains a basic understanding
of the principle and technique, some courts hold that the jury members, aided by cross examination, should be able to consider intelligently whether the technique was applied correctly on
a particular occasion. Id. at 1202-03; see also United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 800
(2d Cir.) ('The district court should focus on whether accepted protocol was adequately followed in a specific case, but the court, in exercising its discretion, should be mindful that this
issue should go more to the weight than to the admissibility of the evidence. Rarely should
such a factual determination be excluded from jury consideration."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
104 (1992). But see United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding
that the court should inquire about an expert's application of technique on a particular occasion
and, on finding an error in the application that is sufficient to negate the basis for the reliability
of the principle itself, the testimony should be excluded), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 734 (1994).
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mony is that the jury has no basis for adequately evaluating the
theory. Expert testimony only is admissible if it is beyond the
common knowledge of the jury. s Yet, ironically, because the
expert testimony is beyond the common knowledge of the jury, the
jury has no criteria by which to evaluate it.29 If courts "simply
toss[ ] [expert testimony] off to the jury under a 'let it all in'
philosophy,"30 unreliable expert testimony may "assume a posture
of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen. ' 31 Thus, it is
up to the courts to make a preliminary evaluation of the reliability
of an expert's theory; otherwise, "[t]he charisma of the expert,
rather than the logic of his explanation, may . . . become paramount, allowing experts to function like oath-helpers
of old in a
3' 2
manner antithetical to notions of rational proof.
III.

FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
INTERPRETED

702 AS WRITTEN AND

In our adversarial system of dispute resolution, for justice we
turn to the lay jury: 33 "[T]hat vital expression of direct democracy
' 34
which charges the entire judicial structure With its moral force.
To allow the jury to perform this important role, we must have a
predictable evidentiary rule for admitting expert testimony that will
35
equip and empower lay jurors to exercise their "common sense"
in a rational and just fashion-a rule that will accommodate cutting-edge technology and the frontiers of scientific discovery but
exclude the charlatan. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 seeks to
accommodate these diverse goals. Rule 702 provides: "If scien28. See FED. R. EvID. 702 & advisory committee's note.
29. See Hand, supra note 8, at 54.

The trouble with [expert testimony] is that it is setting the jury to decide, where
doctors disagree. The whole object of the expert is to tell the jury, not facts, as we

have seen, but general truths derived from his specialized experience. But how can
the jury judge between two statements each founded upon an experience confessedly
foreign in kind to their own? It is just because they are incompetent for such a task
that the expert is necessary at all.

Id.
30. Eymard v. Pan Am. World Airways (In re Air Crash Disaster), 795 F.2d 1230, 1234

(5th Cir. 1986).
31. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
32.

MARGARET

A.

BERGER, CARNEGIE COMM'N ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOV'T,

PROCEDURAL AND EVrDENTIARY MEcHANisMs FOR DEALING WITH EXPERTS IN Toxic TORT
LITIGATION: A CRITIQUE AND PRoPosAL 13-14 (1991).

33. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
34. United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 726, 739 n.20 (D. Mass. 1987), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 867 F.2d 47 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918 (1989).
35. Hand, supra note 8, at 52 n.l.
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tific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
36
or otherwise.
This rule became effective on July 1, 1975 as part of the general promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.37 The rule
was enacted against a backdrop of federal and state common law
dominated by the "general acceptance" test articulated in Frye v.
United States.38 Although Rule 702 makes no mention of "general
acceptance" as a limiting condition on expert testimony derived
from "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge," courts
nonetheless have been sharply divided on whether general acceptance continues to be the governing standard; some courts have
questioned this standard, while others have affirmed the vitality of
the Frye rule.39
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,40 the
Supreme Court addressed this longstanding debate.4n Applying
traditional rules of statutory interpretation, the Court noted that
neither the text nor the legislative history of the Federal Rules of
Evidence-specifically Rule 702, which speaks directly to the
issue of admissibility of expert testimony-mentions Frye or a
rigid "general acceptance" requirement.42 In fact, the Court reasoned that making "general acceptance" the exclusive test for
admitting expert testimony, as required by Frye, is contrary to the
"liberal thrust" of the rules and their "general approach of relaxing
the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony." 43 Thus, the Court
held that the Federal Rules of Evidence supersede the "austere
standard" for admission of expert testimony espoused in Frye.a"
36. FED. R. EvD. 702.

37. See Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 926 (1974). For a legislative
history of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see generally JAMES F. BAEY III& OSCAR M.
TRELLES II, 1-4 THE FEDERAL Rut~s OF EviDENCE LGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED
DOCUMENTS (1980).

38. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Under the Frye test,
a court was not permitted to receive expert opinion testimony in evidence unless the underlying theory of knowledge and the principles of analysis explicating that area of endeavor had
been "generally accept[ed]" by others who were considered experts in that field. Id.
39. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2793 n.5 (1993)
(citing cases having treated the Frye rule).
40. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
41. See id at 2793-98.
42. Il at 2793-94.
43. Id at 2794 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).

44. Il
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Although Rule 702 offers greater flexibility for allowing
expert testimony, it also confers on judges a duty to "ensure that
any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable."4 5 To explain the nature and source of this
duty, the Court drew primarily from the text of Rule 702.46 The
Rule permits an expert to testify in the areas of "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" if the testimony will "assist"
the trier of fact in determining a fact at issue. 47 The reliability
component of a judge's duty requires the judge to determine
whether proposed expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be
deemed "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge." 48
Limiting its discussion to scientific knowledge, the Court stated
that a judge must ensure that proposed expert testimony is "derived
by the scientific method" and is "supported by appropriate validation" or based on "good grounds," that is, actual knowledge as
opposed to subjective belief or unsupported speculation. 49 "In
short, the requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. ' 0
The relevance component of a judge's duty requires the judge
to determine whether an expert's testimony will assist the trier of
fact in determining a fact at issue. 51 Although the Court refers to
relevance and reliability as two separate conditions, the two are in
fact closely related. Indeed, during oral argument in the Daubert
case, the Court noted that, "if [expert testimony] isn't reliable, it
can't assist the trier of fact." 2 Thus, the relevance condition
requires that a court determine whether "a valid scientific connection" exists between the expert's testimony and an issue in the
5
case. 3 '

To facilitate the judicial task of ensuring that expert scientific
testimony is both relevant and reliable, the Court offered several
"general observations. 5 4 The Court noted that "a key question"
will be "whether [the theory or technique] can be (and has been)
45. Id. at 2795.
46. Id. at 2793-94.
47. FED. R. EvID. 702.
48. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-98.
49. Id. at 2795.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2795-96.
52. Official Transcript of Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States at
14, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102).
53. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
54. See id. at 2796-98.
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tested." 55 Judges should consider the "known or potential" error
rate of the technique, as well as "the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique's operation." 56 Additionally,
judges should consider whether the theory has been subjected to
peer review and publication. 5 7 Finally, although it rejected "general acceptance" as the exclusive test for admissibility of expert
testimony, the Court recognized that" 'general acceptance' can yet
have a bearing on the inquiry. ' 8 Notwithstanding the guidance
provided by its "general observations," the Court emphasized that
"[m]any factors will bear on the inquiry" of whether expert scientific testimony meets the relevance and reliability requirements of
Rule 702.5
The Supreme Court in Daubert resolved two long-debated
issues: (1) the "general acceptance" rule espoused in Frye is not
the authoritative standard for the admissibility of expert testimony
in federal court; 60 and (2) federal judges have a gatekeeping function pursuant to which they "must ensure" that expert testimony is
both relevant and reliable before it is admitted in evidence. 6 1 Yet
there is considerable uncertainty as to how judges are to determine
whether expert testimony is relevant and reliable. This uncertainty
exists because the observations offered by the Daubert Court are
vague and because the Court's focus on scientific evidence leaves
courts to speculate on how to address other types of expert
testimony.
Where do we go from here? As this Article will show, the
Daubert opinion not only contains direct guidance to district
judges on how to be gatekeepers of scientific testimony, but also
lays the groundwork for extrapolating these principles to "technical
and other specialized knowledge."
IV.

WHAT DOES THE PHRASE "ScmiNT ic, TECHMCAL,
OTHER SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE' MEAN?

OR

The Supreme Court in Daubert dissected the phrase "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" 62 and limited its
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.at 2796.
ld.
at 2797.
IL
Id.
Id. at 2796.
See id. at 2793.
See id. at 2794-96.

62. FED. R. Evn. 702.
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discussion to the scientific context because the specific expert testimony offered in the case was scientific in nature.63 To gain a
complete understanding of Rule 702, however, one must consider
the meaning of each component of the phrase "scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge."
It is well established that "[t]he starting point in every case
involving construction of a statute is the language itself."' Ordinarily, unambiguous statutory language is regarded as conclusive
because a strong presumption exists that Congress expresses its
intent through the statutory language it chooses.65 When statutory
language is unambiguous, legislative history is relevant only to the
extent that there is a "clearly expressed legislative intention" contrary to the plain meaning of the language.66
Here, the analysis must begin with the plain meaning of the
words "scientific," "technical," and "specialized." With regard to
the adjective "scientific," the Daubert Court stated that " 'scientific' implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science." 67 The definition of "science" refers to "systematic
knowledge of the physical or material world gained through observation and experimentation. 68 Thus, the word "scientific" in Rule
702 appears to refer to knowledge garnered from observation and
experimentation, such as the epidemiological studies, in vitro and
in vivo animal studies, and pharmacological chemical studies
offered as evidence in Daubert.69
Technical knowledge, on the other hand, appears to refer primarily to the mechanical and industrial arts and applied sciences.
"Technic" is defined as "the study or science of an art or of arts in
general, [especially] the mechanical or industrial arts." 70 At least
63. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 n.8 (explaining that the facts of the case narrowed
the analysis to "scientific" knowledge). In Daubert, the litigants offered expert testimony on
whether Bendectin, an antinausea drug, was the cause of birth defects in children born to
mothers who took the drug during pregnancy. Id. at 2791. The proposed expert testimony
was based upon published and unpublished epidemiological studies, in vivo and in vitro
animal studies, and pharmacological studies. Id. at 2791-92.
64. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975).
65. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987) (examining legislative
history only to verify legislative intent); see also Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (stating that statutory language ordinarily is deemed
to be conclusive).
66. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 432 n.12.
67. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795; see supra note 63.
68. RANDOM HousE DIcToNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1716 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter RANDOM HousE DicnONARY].

69. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791-92.
70. RANDOM HousE DIcnONARY, supra note 68, at 1950.
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one definition of "technical" refers to anything "pertaining to or
connected with the mechanical or industrial arts and the applied
sciences."' 71 Thus, technical knowledge may refer to an economist's opinion of damages based on a lost profit or going concern
theory, 72 an engineer's testimony regarding the safe design of

equipment,7374 or a financial expert's testimony regarding projected
cash flows.
The final descriptive word, "specialized," is more general
than the words "scientific" and "technical." Specialized knowledge refers to any knowledge focused on a particular area of study,
profession, or experience. 75 Specialized knowledge thus might
include such diverse topics as a government agent's testimony
regarding the cause of an explosion,76 a witness' knowledge of a
foreign culture, 77 a lawyer's experience in real estate closings,7 8 an
interpreter's proficiency in Spanish, 79 or a federal agent's knowledge of and experience with the communication methods of narcotics dealers.80
71. Id.
72. See Kingsport Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 644 F.2d 566, 569 (6th Cir.
1981) (finding expert witnesses possessed technical knowledge that would assist the jury in
understanding evidence).
73. See Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090, 1100-01 (10th Cir. 1991) (allowing
testimony of an engineer who possessed technical knowledge that would shed light on the
evidence); see also McGowan v. Cooper Indus., 863 F.2d 1266, 1270-71 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that the trial court erred in refusing to admit expert testimony on factory representative's
duties).
74. See In re Broad Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 110 B.R. 632, 637 (Bankr. D. -Conn.)
(stating that only an expert witness who has technical understanding of projected cash flow is
qualified to give estimates), afftd, No. CIV.B.90-170, 1990 WL 293699 (D. Conn. July 20,
1990).
75. RAN)OM HoUSE DIcTIoNARY, supra note 68, at 1831. A "specialist" is one "who
devotes himself or herself to one subject or to one particular branch of subject or pursuit." Id.
Similarly, one who "specializes" pursues "some special line of study, work, etc.' Id.
76. See United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1204-05 (6th Cir. 1985) (deeming a
government agent to have specialized knowledge of explosives), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906
(1986).
77. See Dang Vang v. Vang Xiong X. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476, 480-83 (9th Cir. 1991)
(considering witness's knowledge of Hmong culture and the role of women in that culture to
be specialized knowledge).
78. See United States v. Heath, 970 F.2d 1397, 1405 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that the
trial court erred in limiting testimony of a lawyer with special knowledge in real estate closings), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1643 (1993).
79. See United States v. Taren-Palma, 997 F.2d 525, 531 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that
the testimony of an interpreter fluent in Spanish was properly admitted).
80. See United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1307 (2d Cir.) (finding that a DEA
agent was qualified to testify as an expert on drug codes used by narcotics traffickers), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 958 (1987); see also United States v. Boykin, 986 F.2d 270, 275 (8th Cir.)
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Generally, when words of a statute are connected in the disjunctive by "or," as they are in Rule 702, the basic tenets of construction accord each of the descriptive words a separate
meaning. 8 ' Because "scientific" and "technical" describe two different categories of knowledge, this rule of construction poses no
ambiguity when applied to either of these terms. However,
because the definition of "specialized" does not point to a particular category of knowledge, it is unclear whether the phrase "other
specialized knowledge" is modified by the words "scientific" and
"technical," thereby limiting the phrase to scientific or technical
"specialized" knowledge, or whether "other specialized knowledge" is intended to extend beyond scientific and technical
knowledge.
Under the principle ejusdem generis, "where general words
follow an enumeration of specific terms, the general words are
read to apply only to other items like those specifically enumerated."82 However, "[w]here the list of objects that precedes the
'or other' phrase is dissimilar, ejusdem generis does not apply, 83
and the phrase "or other" is interpreted as a catch-all phrase
extending beyond the previously listed objects.84 Accordingly,
because the words "scientific" and "technical" in Rule 702
describe two dissimilar categories of knowledge, the ejusdem
generis rule does not apply, and the phrase "other specialized
knowledge" should be interpreted as a catch-all phrase extending
beyond the categories of knowledge described as scientific and
technical. This interpretation is supported by the legislative history
surrounding Rule 702.85
During the hearings that preceded the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 did not evoke much attention or dissimilar to the
cussion. Indeed, the first draft of Rule 702 was very
86
text of the rule that Congress ultimately adopted.
Rule 702, as included in the March 1969 Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Rules of Evidence, stated: "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under(allowing testimony of narcotics police officer with special knowledge of modus operandi of
drug dealers), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 241 (1993).

81. See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 73 (1984).
82. Id. at 74.
83. Sacramento Regional County Sanitation Dist. v. Reilly, 905 F.2d 1262, 1270 (9th
Cir. 1990) (citing Garcia, 469 U.S. at 73).
84. Id.
85. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
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stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by special knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto. 8 7 The Proposed Rule drew on
the language contained in both the Model Code of Evidence and
the Uniform Rules of Evidence requiring an expert to be qualified
dto
by "special knowledge, skill, experience or training. "188 A
Additionally, the Rule required that the expert's testimony be based on "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge."8 9 The
Advisory Committee's Note (the Note) following the Draft Rule
contains no discussion of the intended meaning of the phrase "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge." 90
Few changes were made to the text of Rule 702 after the initial 1969 draft. In the Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, 9 ' the Advisory Committee (the Committee) deleted the
word "special" before the phrase "knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education. 9 2 Additionally, the Committee amended its
Note to include the following passage:
87. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DisTRIcr COURTS AND MAGISTRATES Rule 702 (1969) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
PROPOSED RULES], reprinted in 2 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 37, document 5, at 142.
88. See MODEL CODE OF EVID. Rule 402 (1942), reprinted in I BAILEY & TRELLES,
supra note 37, document 1, at 202. The Model Code defined an expert witness as a witness
who is qualified by "special knowledge, skill, experience or training." Id. Similarly, the Uniform Rules of Evidence provided that expert testimony in the form of an opinion was limited
to opinions "within the scope of the special knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed
by the witness." UNIF. R. EVID. 56 (1953) (amended 1974), reprintedin 1 BAILEY & TREU.ES,
supra note 37, document 2, at 193.
89. PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES, supra note 87, Rule 702 & advisory committee's note, reprinted in 2 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 37, document 5, at 142-43.
90. Id.
91. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REVISED DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS
AND MAGISTRATES (1971) [hereinafter REVISED DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES], reprintedin 2
BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 37, document 6.
92. Id. Rule 702, reprintedin 2 BAILEY & TRELLES, supra note 37, document 6, at 89.

The Rule continued to require the subject of the expert's testimony be "scientific, technical or
other specialized knowledge." Id.
The New York Trial Lawyers Committee on the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence and
the American College of Trial Lawyers suggested that the word "special," which preceded the
second "knowledge" in the first draft, be deleted to "avoid unnecessary debate over... meaning." 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702[01], at
702-7 n.1 (1993). The deletion of the word "special" implies that an expert qualified by "general" knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education would meet the requirements of the
Rule as long as the subject of the testimony is "scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge." Cf id. 1 702[04], at 702-45 (explaining that the word "special" was removed
because it is too restrictive to require special knowledge, and that qualification by reason of
knowledge is sufficient). In the absence of legislative history explaining the deletion, how-
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The fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited to merely the "scientific" and "technical" but extend to all
"specialized" knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in
a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by "knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education." Thus within the scope of the
rule are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g.
physicians, physicists, and architects, but also the large group
sometimes called "skilled" witnesses, such as bankers or landowners testifying to land values.93

The first sentence of this portion of the Note supports the
interpretation of "other specialized knowledge" previously discussed. Specifically, by separately referring to scientific and technical knowledge, the Note reinforces the plain meaning of the
words as referring to separate and distinct categories of knowledge. 94 Additionally, by stating that the phrase is not "limited" to
scientific and technical knowledge but "extends" to "all" specialized knowledge, the Note supports a broad interpretation of "other
specialized" knowledge. 95
V.

DETERMINING IF AN EXPERT'S THEORY

Is

"KNOWLEDGE"

Rule 702 states that expert testimony must be based on "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. 96 Reasoning
that knowledge is more than "subjective belief or unsupported
speculation," 97 the Daubert Court stated that to be considered

knowledge, an expert's theory must be reliable. 98 The question
then arises: How are federal judges to determine if an expert's
theory is sufficiently reliable to qualify as knowledge? Anticipating this question, the Daubert Court offered several "general

observations" to guide federal judges in determining the reliability
of scientific knowledge. 99
ever, it is speculative to infer any particular intent from the change. See Hearingson Proposed
Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice (Formerly Designated as Special
Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws) of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprintedin 3 BAILEY & TRELL.ES, supra note 37, document 12, at 230

n.6 ("The deletion of so special a word as 'special' seems to call for some explanation, but
none is given, leaving the 'legislative history' of Rule 702 muddy at best.").
93. REVISED DRAFr OF PROPOSED RULES, supra note 91, Rule 702 & advisory committee's note, reprintedin 2 BAILEY & TRELLEs, supra note 37, document 6, at 89.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See FED. R. Evm. 702 & advisory committee's note.
See id.
Id. 702.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phamaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993).
Id.
Id. at 2796-98; see supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. Questioning the

future implications of the Court's "general observations," the dissent queried, "Does all of this
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This Article submits that because expert testimony must be
based on knowledge-the antecedent of which is reliability-the
district courts have a duty to ensure reliability, whether the theory
is categorized as scientific, technical, or specialized. Although the
specific factors noted by the DaubertCourt may indicate the reliability of scientific knowledge, however, they might not offer probative evidence of reliability for all types of expert testimony.
Recognizing the futility of attempting to compile a checklist of
reliability factors that will apply to other categories of knowledge,
this Article instead suggests a method by which judges can determine appropriate measures of reliability on a case-by-case basis.
Specifically, by considering the epistemology of an expert's theory, that is, its "origin, nature, methods, and limits," 10 judges may
gain significant insight into the reliability of the theory.
Such an epistemological analysis begins by clearly identifying
the theory on which the expert proposes to base her testimony. In
accordance with Rule 702, an expert's theory is only admissible if
it qualifies as knowledge.' 01 Knowledge may be comprised of
"known facts or ...

ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as

truths on good grounds." 0 2 Where an expert's theory is so firmly
established among members of the field that it is considered a
known fact or accepted truth-such as the theories that undergird
the physical laws of the universe in the field of physics or chemistry, the methods of quantitative analysis employed in mathematics
or statistics, the fundamentals of anatomy and physiology that
inform the medical sciences, or the principles of weather patterns
applied in meteorology-a court may take judicial notice of the
reliability of the theory. 0 3

On the other hand, when an expert proposes to testify to a
theory that is not so well established that it may be considered
accepted truth, a judge should require a clear articulation of the
theory and its fundamental underpinnings.0 4 Once articulated, the
dicta apply to an expert seeking to testify on the basis of 'technical or other specialized knowledge' ... or are the 'general observations' limited only to 'scientific knowledge'?" Id. at 2800
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
100. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY, supra note 68, at 654. Epistemology is the "branch

of philosophy that investigates the origin, nature, methods, and limits of human knowledge."
Id.
101. FED. R. EviD. 702.
102. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 (quoting WEBS'Tm'S Tnmw NEw INTERNA-rONAL DicTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1252 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1986)).
103. See id. at 2796 n.11.
104. See id. at 2796-97. In considering the admissibility of novel scientific evidence, a
DNA profiling analysis, the Second Circuit recently stated, "A general understanding of the
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court should consider whether the theory is logically sound. A
judge may consider whether the theory is internally consistent,
whether it provides an intelligible explanation for an observed phenomenon (a "purely tautological hypothesis" is of little or no
explanatory value), and whether the theory is consistent with other
theories that are accepted as fact within the particular field of
endeavor. 05 These considerations will assist judges in determining the reliability of0 6any type of theory, whether scientific, technical, or specialized.1
Courts should also consider the theory's origin and evolution.
Knowledge, whether categorized as scientific, technical, or specialized, evolves from the validation of a theory or hypothesis-an
idea.' 0 7 The processes that transform particular ideas into validated knowledge may vary. But each process, as different as it
may be from another, can be characterized as an evolutionary continuum along which an idea travels in its quest for validation. The
scientific theories and procedures involved is necessary to understand the legal and practical
impact of such evidence." United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 791 (2d Cir.), cert.denied,
113 S.Ct. 104 (1992). The court then proceeded to conduct a detailed, three-page analysis of
the nature and origins of DNA profiling generally and the application of such principles by the
particular expert in the case. See id. at 791-93; see also Deluca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 945 (3d Cir. 1990) ("To competently analyze the legal issues
presented by this appeal, an understanding of the relevant scientific principles, albeit necessarily a rudimentary one ... is essential.").

Some expert theories may be easily disqualified if the expert is unable to articulate the
specific theory on which her testimony is based and the factual or accepted theoretical underpinnings that justify the theory. For example, an astrologist or a ouija board operator will
likely not be able to articulate a factual or accepted theoretical basis for her theory.
105. See Francisco J. Ayala & Bert Black, Decision Will Lead to Improvement in
Courts' Screening of Scientific Evidence, 21 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, pt. 2, at
28, 29 (Summer-Fall 1993).
106. See Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 786, 797-98 (identifying factors that may bear on the
reliability of expert testimony, including "the clarity with which the technique may be
explained" and "the novelty of the technique and its relationship to more established areas of
scientific analysis"); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238-39 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing,
among other things, the novelty of the technique as shown through its relationship to more
established modes of analysis); see also 3 WJwsTEiN & BERrER, supra note 92, 702[03], at
702-41 to 702-42 (noting a variety of factors that the court should consider as indicators of
reliability, including the "novelty of the new invention").
Each of these sources cites additional factors that may have bearing on reliability, such as
the qualifications and professional stature of the expert, the existence of specialized publications, the rate of error of the theory, and the "non-judicial" uses to which the technique is put.
See Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 797-98; Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238-39; 3 WEISamsrF & BnRGER,
supra note 92, 702[03], at 702-41 to 702-42. This Article suggests, however, that although
these factors are relevant in determining the reliability of certain types of knowledge, courts
should focus on the nature and origin of the theory to decipher the most appropriate indicia of
reliability on a case-by-case basis.
107. See Ayala & Black, supra note 105, at 29.
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distance an idea has traveled along this continuum provides evidence of its reliability.
The Daubert Court, while not explicitly identifying an evolutionary continuum, observed that the reliability of scientific evidence may be gauged by looking to the factors that trace the
evolution of scientific knowledge, such as tests, peer-reviewed
publications, and acceptance among the relevant scientific community.1 08 The Court first noted that "[s]cientific methodology.., is
based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can
be falsified."10 9 Once a theory has been tested, 110 it may be subjected to the scrutiny of other members of the field through publication and peer review.1 ' Ultimately, the theory may become
known within the relevant
scientific community and attract wide112
spread acceptance.
Although the particular factors of reliability described by the
Court in Daubertmay not be relevant to determining the reliability
of all types of knowledge, this Article submits that the method by
which the Court elicited those factors may be helpful in determining the reliability of other areas of expertise. Specifically, by tracing the process through which an idea becomes knowledge, a court
may identify factors relevant to determining the reliability of the
theory involved.
108. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796-97 (1993).
109. Id. at 2796 (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation,
86 Nw. U. L. Rv.643, 645 (1992)).
110. When test results are available, courts should obtain specific information regarding
each study or test conducted by the expert or others, including (1) testing conditions; (2) the
size of the population studied; (3) the methodology applied; (4) the number of studies completed; (5) the method of recording data; (6) the results of each study; and (7) the margin of
error. For a case considering several of these factors, see Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 311-13 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990).
111. See Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2797. When an opportunity exists to validate the theory
through peer review and the expert has not submitted the theory for external scrutiny, courts
may become skeptical of the expert's own confidence in the validity of the theory. See
Eymard v. Pan Am. World Airways (In re Air Crash Disaster), 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir.
1986).
Many experts are members of the academic community who supplement their teaching salaries with consulting work. We know from our judicial experience that many
such able persons present studies and express opinions that they might not be willing
to express in an article submitted to a refereed journal of their discipline or in other
contexts subject to peer review. We think that is one important signal, along with
many others, that ought to be considered in deciding whether to accept expert
testimony.
Id.
112. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
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Given the broad spectrum of knowledge that may be the subject of expert testimony, one can assume that the epistemology of
individual theories will vary significantly. Many theories will not
evolve from hypothesis to knowledge through formal observation
and experimentation. For example, some theories may evolve
from the application of an expert's "knowledge, skill, experience,
13
training, or education" to a particular problem or situation."
When a theory originates in such an informal manner, testing and
specialized journals are not viable avenues for validating the theory or subjecting it to the critical scrutiny of the relevant community. Rather, the practical uses, particularly nonjudicial uses, to
which the theory has been put by the expert or others will provide
14
evidence of external scrutiny and validation (or invalidation).'
Also, the expert's qualifications and professional stature will be
factors bearing on the reliability of the theory." 5 Thus, although
Daubert's"general observations" may not be directly applicable to
all types of knowledge, tracing the development of the knowledge
at issue-as the DaubertCourt did-may be a useful tool in identifying appropriate indicia of reliability on a case-by-case basis.
VI.

CONCLUSION

If a jury understands the subject matter through its common
experience, expert opinion is not admissible because it will not
assist the trier of fact." 1 6 It is only when neither judge nor jury can
make sense of the underlying data that expert opinion evidence is
admissible. ' 7 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the determination by district judges to receive such evidence. In the wake of
Daubert's carefully reasoned mandate, this determination will
depend on the trial court's understanding of the meaning of the
113. FED. R. Evni.

702.

114. See, e.g., United States v. Carswell, 922 F.2d 876, 878-79 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating
fact that witness or others relied on the theory "in a context independent of courtroom" provides some indicia of reliability); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1239 (3d Cir.

1985) (stating that nonjudicial uses to which the theory has been applied may be a factor
bearing upon the reliability of the theory); 3 WNsTEIrN & BERGER, supra note 92,

702[03],

at 702-41 (citing "the use which has been made of the new technique" as evidence of
reliability).
115. See United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 797 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.

104 (1992) (stating that an expert's qualifications and stature are relevant considerations in
determining reliability of a theory); Downing, 753 F.2d at 1239 (stating that an expert's qualifications and stature offer circumstantial evidence that the technique is reliable); 3 WEINsTEIN
& BERGER, supra note 92, 1 702[03], at 702-41 (same).
116. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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Rule as explicated by the case law. Since the Rule posits a series
of different if overlapping bases for expert opinion-scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge-the specific factors
tending to show reliability are likely to vary depending on the basis
of the proferred knowledge.
The Daubert Court, in its well-considered dictum, offered
substantial guidance for determining whether purported expert scientific evidence is based on knowledge and is thus reliable. 118 By
tracing the phases through which scientific ideas progress to
become accepted knowledge, the Court identified factors that may
provide indicia of the reliability of scientific theories. 119 Although
these particular factors may not be altogether relevant in determining the reliability of technical or other specialized knowledge, the
reasoning employed by the DaubertCourt may be applied to other
types of knowledge. Specifically, courts may gain significant
insight into the reliability of a theory by conducting an epistemological analysis, first assessing whether the theory is soundly
grounded in logical reasoning, and then examining the theory's
progress along the evolutionary continuum that leads to validation
or recognition of the theory as knowledge.

118. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796-98
(1993).
119. See id.; see also supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.

